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Introduction
As the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Clean Air
Act (CAA) reach their respective fiftieth anniversaries, President
Donald Trump’s administration is bending the historic trajectory of
both the Agency and the Act.1 For most of its existence, the EPA’s
path has been “progressive” in that the statutes the EPA implements,
including the CAA, obligate the Agency to advance its regulations as
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1.

Clean Air Act Requirements and History, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-requirements-and-history [https://perma
.cc/JN8E-5LR5] (last updated Jan. 10, 2017).
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science and technology progress.2 The EPA’s rule-making under the
CAA must integrate advances in our understanding of the effects of air
pollution on the environment and on public health, as well as new
methods to curb pollution.
Provisions of the CAA ensure a continual and comprehensive
response to the threats posed by air pollution.3 These include the EPA’s
obligation to periodically update pollution-control-technology
standards and to review the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) so that the standards reflect the latest science. The CAA
specifies many of these mandates explicitly.4 Where the Act is vague in
whether and how it applies to emerging understandings of air-quality
challenges, the EPA has read the language to be capacious enough to
require or authorize the Agency to take the actions needed to solve
these new problems.5 To do so, the EPA evaluates new science to find
CAA-based solutions to meet the Act’s emission-reduction goals. The
EPA has also generally understood the CAA as granting the Agency
the authority to allow compliance flexibility for regulated sources while
still meeting the required emissions reductions.6 The courts have mostly
ratified the EPA’s interpretive approach.7 This bolsters the Agency’s
understanding that the CAA contains the necessary tools for it to
achieve continually improve air quality.
The Trump EPA is working to change the Agency’s progressive
trajectory through a series of rule rollbacks based on interpretations of
the CAA that narrow the Agency’s legal authority. The EPA is no
2.

See William Boyd, The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, in Lessons from the Clean Air Act 15, 18–19 (Ann
Carlson & Dallas Burtraw eds., 2019).

3.

In 2017, the Office of Management and Budget estimated that rules issued
by the EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation resulted in $180.5–665.4 billion
of annual benefits. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 2017 Report to
Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations
and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act 10 (2017), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/12/2019-CATS-5885-REV_DOC-2017Cost_BenefitReport11_
18_2019.docx.pdf (“Across the Federal government, the rules with the
highest estimated benefits as well as the highest estimated costs come
from [the EPA] and in particular its Office of Air and Radiation.
Specifically, EPA rules account for 71[%] to 80[%] of the monetized
benefits and 55[%] to 64[%] of the monetized costs. Of these, rules that
have a significant aim to improve air quality account for over 95[%] of the
benefits of EPA rules.”).

4.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 note (2018) (Promoting Domestic
Manufacturing and Job Creation—Policies and Procedures Relating to
Implementation of Air Quality Standards).

5.

See infra Part I.B.

6.

See infra Part I.B.

7.

See infra Part I.B.
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longer conducting rigorous empirical analyses to understand and solve
air-quality problems; instead, it is interpreting the CAA to establish
that it lacks the authority to act.8 In so doing, the Trump Admin–
istration is reaching the conclusion that the EPA is directly or indirectly
bound by the Act to do less to control air pollution.9 The Trump EPA
is also discarding the balance between compliance flexibility and airquality goals. It is deregulating to provide leniency to regulated sources
and to preclude the Agency from re-embracing a more progressive
interpretation of the CAA in the future.10 Through these actions, the
EPA is defying its own mission as well as the language and logic of the
statute.
If successful, the Trump EPA will curtail the Agency’s long-term
ability to effectively regulate sources of pollution, including greenhouse
gas emissions. The Administration is advancing this deregulatory goal
through two primary methods: imposing a static interpretation of the
statutory text to limit its power to regulate; and undermining the
structure of key provisions of the Act that contemplate a comprehensive
strategy to reducing pollution. Through the latter strategy, the Trump
EPA defeats the comprehensive nature of the CAA’s pollutionabatement programs by disaggregating pollution sources and pollution
reductions and sub-categorizing benefits when the Agency must
determine whether to regulate. By looking narrowly at each problem,
the EPA is preemptively justifying its conclusion that no action is
warranted. In two recent rule-makings, the EPA acknowledges that the
regulatory change will have negligible impacts on pollution levels.11
Instead, the rule-makings emphasize the Agency’s new legal inter–
pretations, strongly suggesting that their purpose is to hamstring the
EPA’s future efforts to use the CAA to address emissions, especially
climate pollutants.
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, we provide an overview
of the foundation of the CAA, its progressive logic, and the judiciary’s
affirmation of the EPA’s broad authority to address evolving air-quality
problems. Second, we detail four actions by the Trump EPA that
exemplify the Agency’s strategy of undermining its own statutory
authority: its repeal of the Clean Power Plan and the promulgation of
the Affordable Clean Energy rule, its revocation of the waiver for
8.

See infra Part II.

9.

See infra Part II.

10.

See infra Part II.

11.

See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emissions Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions
to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520,
32,536 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also Oil and
Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and
Modified Sources Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,244, 50,257 (proposed Sept. 24,
2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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California’s regulation of greenhouse-gas-tailpipe emissions and the
zero-emissions-vehicle program, its reversal of the “appropriate-andnecessary” finding for regulating hazardous air-pollutant emissions from
power plants, and its proposed New Source Performance Standards for
the oil and natural-gas sector.12 Third, we conclude by describing the
consequences of these actions.

I.

The Clean Air Act’s Progressive Nature

Congress designed the CAA to make continuous progress towards
cleaner air. The CAA’s first purpose is “to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare.”13 The Act further states that “[a] primary goal of the Act
is to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and
local governmental actions . . . for pollution prevention.”14 The logic of
the CAA is that the EPA must effectively protect the environment and
public health in a manner that is reasonable for each specific pollutioncontrol provision. As Senator Muskie affirmed during the 1970 debate
on the Act, “Congress should make . . . commitments to meaningful
environmental protection; effective protection of the health of all
Americans; and the early achievement of these goals.”15 Though these
goals have proven more difficult to meet, Congress successfully enacted
such a statute and tasked the EPA with continually working toward
achieving its purposes.16 The courts have reinforced the EPA’s statutory
mandates, and have mostly upheld stringent pollution-control require–
ments based on the Agency’s statutory interpretations.17 The courts
have allowed the Agency to implement the statute in a less demanding
manner only when the judiciary finds it is authorized by statute to do
so.
A.

The Clean Air Act’s Clear Statutory Mandate for Progress

Woven into the CAA’s fabric is a congressional mandate for
progress, not through the sweeping aspirational language found in other
environmental statutes, but by requiring recurrent standard-setting and
upgrades to pollution-control techniques. The CAA demands that every
five years the EPA determine whether the latest science compels a
12.

At the time this Article went to the publishers, the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs was reviewing the EPA’s final rule revising the
New Source Performance Standards for the oil and natural-gas sector.

13.

Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2018) (emphasis
added).

14.

Id. § 101(c).

15.

116 Cong. Rec. 32,903 (1970).

16.

Clean Air Act § 101 (b).

17.

See infra Part I.B.
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revision of the NAAQS.18 If it does, then the EPA Administrator must
revise the NAAQS accordingly. The Act further requires that every
eight years the EPA determine whether technological advances warrant
tightening emission standards for new and modified stationary sources
of pollution.19 Congress complemented those tasks with mandates that
the EPA act when states fail to meet their regulatory obligations
triggered by the Agency’s updates to the air-quality standards. In
addition to the mechanisms designed to result in continually declining
pollution, Congress suffused the Act’s language with calls for the
continuous reduction of air pollution. Maximalist adjectives are the
foundation of the various technological standards: best available control
technology,20 maximum achievable control technology,21 best system of
emission reduction,22 and lowest achievable emission rate,23 for example.
The Act’s central science-based, technological-diffusion mechanism
begins with the EPA’s mandatory review of the NAAQS. The Admin–
istrator must “complete a thorough review” of each ambient-air
standard at five-year intervals and “make such revisions . . . and
promulgate such new standards as may be appropriate”24 to ensure the
NAAQS “accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge.”25 To fulfill
this mandate, the EPA conducts a comprehensive review of the existing
science through an extensive multi-step process that involves the
Agency’s expert staff and contributions from an independent expert
review committee.26 After the EPA receives public input and advice
from experts, it decides whether to revise the allowable level of pollution
in the ambient air. This decision must be based solely on public-health

18.

Clean Air Act § 109(d)(1).

19.

Id. §§ 111(b)(1)(B), 112(f)(2)(A).

20.

Id. § 169(3).

21.

Id. § 112(g)(2).

22.

Id. § 111(a)(1).

23.

Id. § 171(3).

24.

Id. § 109(d)(1).

25.

Id. § 108(a)(2).

26.

Congress chartered The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
(CASAC) to advise the EPA on the adequacy of the existing standards
and whether revisions are needed. EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee Charter, EPA, https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/
WebCASAC/currentcharter?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/H4DD5GV8] (last updated Sept. 21, 2015); see also Clean Air Act § 109 (d).
Historically, the EPA has also formed auxiliary committees focused on
certain pollutants, such as the Particulate Matter Review Panel, to assist
the CASAC. See Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC)
Particulate Matter (PM) Review Panel, EPA, https://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/WebAllCASAC/casacpmpanel.html [https://perma
.cc/5FX5-47ZZ] (last updated Nov. 17, 2015).
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considerations and may not consider other concerns such as cost or
feasibility.27
Because of the increasing understanding of air pollution’s impact
on human health, the NAAQS review process frequently results in the
EPA tightening the existing standards. This triggers a chain of
obligations for both the EPA and for states, resulting in new actions
requiring further pollution reductions. The EPA first designates
counties as either meeting the new standards (“in attainment”) or
exceeding the standards (“non-attainment”).28 States must then develop
“State Implementation Plans” requiring pollution sources to reduce
pollution to levels that will both ensure non-attainment counties reach
attainment and “prevent significant deterioration” in areas that are
already in attainment.29 The plans rely on pollution-abatement
technology to be diffused across sources and statutory programs, and
they include requirements that newly constructed or renovated facilities
install and operate up-to-date technology.30 The installation and
operation of those technologies foster further pollution-control
innovations that inform future requirements for new pollution sources.
Thus, Congress created a mechanism to continually incorporate the
latest public-health science into CAA programs, in part so that
pollution-control methods across the United States would constantly
improve.31
Other provisions in the CAA also obligate EPA to advance science
and technology. Prior to the enactment of the CAA, California
established the first automobile-tailpipe-emissions standards to combat
the state’s serious smog challenges.32 While Congress established a
program for national tailpipe emissions in the CAA in 1970, it also
recognized California’s uniquely severe air-quality problems and ratified
the state’s role as an ongoing leader in forcing technology advancements
by the auto industry. Section 209 of the CAA preempts states from
establishing tailpipe-emissions standards, but it authorizes the EPA to
grant California a waiver if California establishes that its standards are
at least as protective as the national standards and if the state meets

27.

See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001).

28.

Clean Air Act § 107(d).

29.

Id. § 110 (State Implementation Plans).

30.

Id. §§ 110(a)(2)(C), 165(a)(4), 173.

31.

Boyd, supra note 2, at 18 (“By design, the NAAQS program is always in
motion, but the goals and overall direction of the program are clear, and
there are procedural mechanisms in place that continue to push the
program forward.”).

32.

History, Ca. Air Resources Board, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history
[https://perma.cc/S4CD-P286] (last visited June 23, 2020).
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certain criteria.33 Congress built into the statute a presumption that the
EPA would grant California a waiver by placing on the EPA, and any
opponents of the waiver, the burden to demonstrate that one of three
criterion for denying a waiver has not been met.34 Only then may the
EPA deny the request. Ratifying California’s role as a technology leader
and conferring a statutory presumption in its favor shows the lengths
Congress went to bolster the CAA’s technology-forcing and emissionsreductions goals.
For decades, California has carried out that role by adopting a
series of tailpipe-emissions programs and seeking and receiving § 209
waivers to enforce its requirements for innovative automotive-pollutioncontrol technology. For example, in 1990, California established its
Zero-Emission Vehicle regulation requiring auto-manufacturers to
produce and offer for sale a specific number of cars with the most
advanced emissions technology.35 The EPA granted a waiver for the
program in 1993.36 In 2004, years before the federal government began
regulating greenhouse-gas-tailpipe emissions, California set standards
for automotive greenhouse-gas emissions, and in 2009, the EPA issued
a waiver for that program.37 Furthermore, under CAA § 177, other
33.

Clean Air Act § 209(b)(1) (“The Administrator shall . . . waive
application of this section to any State which has adopted
standards . . . for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines
that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective
of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.”).

34.

Id. § 209(e)(2)(A)(i)–(iii); see also California State Motor Vehicle
Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of
Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model
Year Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74
Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,745 (July 8, 2009) (“Congress recognized that
California could serve as a pioneer and a laboratory for the nation in
setting new motor vehicle emission standards. Congress intentionally
structured this waiver provision to restrict and limit [the] EPA’s ability
to deny a waiver, and did this to ensure that California had broad
discretion in selecting the means it determined best to protect the health
and welfare of its citizens.”).

35.

Zero Emission Vehicle Program, Ca. Air Resources Board,
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/zero-emission-vehicle-program/
about [https://perma.cc/UYN7-WNC3] (last visited June 23, 2020); see
also Notice of California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards;
Waiver of Federal Preemption; Decision, 58 Fed. Reg. 4166 (July 13,
1993).

36.

Notice of California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 58
Fed. Reg. at 4,166.

37.

California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 32,745; see also Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National
Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal”, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
343, 349–51 (2011) (describing the history of federal and state regulations
of greenhouse-gas tailpipe emissions).
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states have the authority to adopt California’s standards once a waiver
is granted.38 While CAA § 209 encourages technology development, §
177 facilitates technology dissemination and emissions reductions on a
broad scale.39
The history of greenhouse-gas regulation under the CAA provides
another example of the Act’s foundational features. Once Congress or
the EPA determines that a pollutant poses a threat to public health or
the environment, the EPA and the states are charged with carrying out
a network of mandates to comprehensively solve the problem and to
advance technological developments.40 In 2003, a coalition of environ–
mental organizations, states, and cities sued the EPA for its failure to
regulate greenhouse gases after the EPA denied their petition seeking
regulation on the grounds that it lacked the statutory authority to do
so.41 In 2007, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA42 found that
greenhouse gases “fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious
definition of ‘air pollutant’” and that EPA had the authority to regulate
these pollutants.43 This decision compelled the Agency to conduct an
analysis to determine whether greenhouse gases emitted by automotive
sources endangered the public’s health and welfare.44 Ultimately, the
Agency determined that they did and that new motor vehicles “cause
and contribute to” greenhouse-gas pollution.45 These two findings
triggered a CAA requirement to regulate vehicles’ greenhouse-gastailpipe emissions. Regulation of emissions from mobile sources meant,
in turn, that greenhouse gases were generally “subject to regulation”
under the CAA, triggering still other statutory provisions related to
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.46 This cascade of new
38.

Clean Air Act § 177.

39.

Compare id. § 209, with id. § 177.

40.

See, e.g., id. § 169 (requiring the EPA, and permitting the states, to
prevent the construction of major emitting facilities).

41.

Petition for Review, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-1361).

42.

549 U.S. 497 (2007).

43.

Id. at 532.

44.

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497–
99 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).

45.

Id.

46.

See, e.g., Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emissions Guidelines for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating
Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations, 84
Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 60)
(regulating greenhouse gas emissions from power plants under Clean Air
Act § 111(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. 7411 (2018)). But see Util. Air Regulatory
Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (holding that the EPA may regulate
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regulations reflects the progressive nature of the CAA’s regulatory
apparatus.
The CAA’s language clearly demonstrates Congress’s intention that
the EPA become an agency reliant on, and helping to aid, the
advancement of science and technology. Congress mandated for the
EPA a permanent, ongoing agenda defined and driven by such
advances. Over time, the EPA’s actions in following this agenda have
made practical contributions to scientific and technological advance–
ment, resulting in a virtuous cycle supporting continual air-quality
improvement.
Congress balanced this demand with constraints that guide the
Agency and ensure feasible regulatory requirements. One of the explicit
purposes of the CAA is to promote reasonable pollution-prevention
strategies.47 Accordingly, and as appropriate, Congress explicitly
instructs the EPA to consider costs and other consequences of requiring
certain pollution-control technologies.48 In turn, the courts have
interpreted certain CAA provisions as affording the Agency sufficient
latitude to offer regulated sources a certain level of compliance
flexibility.49 This expansive reading of the Agency’s authority in
compliance matters mirrors the broad authority granted the Agency
through the progressive elements of the statute. Though these
feasibility requirements constrain the EPA, in the sense that it cannot
mandate unreasonable pollution-control programs, even if those
programs would result in large emissions reductions, they align with the
Act’s progressive air-quality goals. The limitations ensure the regulated
community can meet the statute’s pollution-reduction requirements,
which are a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the CAA.
B.

The EPA’s Understanding of Its Mandate

Since the passage of the 1990 CAA amendments, the EPA has
understood the Act as containing the tools necessary for adapting the
statute to confront newly discerned air-quality issues. Many comment–
ers point to congressional inaction on climate change as driving the
greenhouse gases from already-regulated sources, but it cannot read the
regulation of greenhouse gases under Clean Air Act § 202 as triggering
Title V and Prevention of Significant Deterioration permitting
requirements).
47.

Clean Air Act § 101(c).

48.

E.g., id. § 169(3) (“The term ‘best available control technology’ means an
emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each
pollutant subject to regulation under this [Act] . . . which the permitting
authority . . . taking into account energy, environmental, and economic
impacts and other costs, determines is achievable . . . .”).

49.

See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (“We hold that the EPA’s definition of the term ‘source’ is a
permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate
progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth.”).
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EPA’s expansive understanding of its statutory authority.50 Regardless
of the impetus, the way in which CAA authorities have created the
EPA’s need to address modern air-quality problems and facilitated
EPA’s responses reinforces the statute’s progressive design. The EPA
under George W. Bush and Barack Obama adopted an expansive
reading of the CAA to accomplish the Agency’s goals.51 The Bush
Administration generally privileged low regulatory costs when ident–
ifying the issue to be addressed, and, as a result, read its statutory
authority as sufficiently expansive to promote compliance flexibility.52
The Obama EPA, however, read the Act as providing the Agency with
the latitude to design innovative pollution-control programs as newly
understood air-quality challenges reached levels of urgency sufficient to
demand solutions.53
The EPA’s effort to address the long-range transport of air
pollution, an effort spanning three administrations, crystallizes the
EPA’s, and the courts’, progressive reading of the CAA. The EPA put
in place a multi-state emissions-trading program, relying entirely on the
authority granted to the Agency in CAA § 110(a)(2)(D) and (c)(1),
which help ensure that all states implement plans to meet the
NAAQS54:
Each implementation plan submitted by a State . . . shall . . .
contain adequate provisions prohibiting . . . any source or other
type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air
pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other
State . . . .55
The administrator shall promulgate a Federal implementation
plan at any time within [two] years after the Administrator finds
50.

See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2014) (“[D]uring periods of congressional dysfunction,
agencies must adapt aging statutory authority to new problems, shifting
the locus of policymaking first to agencies and then to the courts.”).

51.

See Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97); see also Clean
Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,161 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97).

52.

The Bush administration, however, denied a petition to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, determining that the
Agency lacked the statutory authority to do so. Notice of Denial of
Petition for Rulemaking of Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003).

53.

See, e.g., Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208.

54.

Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(D), (c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D), (c)(1)
(2018).

55.

Id. § 110(a) (emphasis added).
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that a State has failed to make a required submission or finds
that the plan or plan revision submitted by the State does not
satisfy the minimum criteria . . . or disapproves a State
implementation plan submission in whole or in part . . . .56

Notably, both provisions are silent as to the type of action they
require the EPA to take. From the words “adequate provisions” and
“contribute significantly,” and the mandate to implement federal plans
when states do not meet the minimum criteria, the EPA designed a
multi-pollutant emissions-trading program affecting twenty-seven
states, which the Supreme Court ultimately upheld.57 Building on an
effort that began during the Clinton presidency,58 the Bush
Administration in 2005 promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (the
“Interstate Rule”) to address pollution from upwind states that was
preventing downwind states from meeting the NAAQS.59 The rule
required statewide emissions reductions in order to comply with the
CAA, and it included EPA-administered voluntary cap-and-trade
programs.60 States could require power plants to join the cap-and-trade
programs in order to meet the Interstate Rule’s requirements “in a
flexible and cost-effective manner.”61
The D.C. Circuit invalidated the Interstate Rule in 2008 for
multiple reasons, including that the EPA set region-wide caps rather
than state-specific caps.62 The court determined that the statute called
for state-specific emissions-reduction obligations.63 The court based its
objection to the Interstate Rule on the determination that the features
of the program violated the CAA by failing to sufficiently address the
long-range pollution impact on downwind air quality.64 The court did
not even consider whether the EPA lacked the authority to establish
such a comprehensive regulatory program under the statute’s express

56.

Id. § 110(c)(1) (emphasis added).

57.

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 5244 (2014).

58.

Supplemental Notice for the Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group
Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed.
Reg. 25,902 (May 11, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 76, 96).

59.

Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,161, 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to
be codified at C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96).

60.

Id. at 25,165–70.

61.

Id. at 25,162.

62.

North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 908.
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terms.65 Rather, the court accepted the premise that the statute
authorized the EPA to create a program more elaborate than either the
one proposed in the Interstate Rule or the Title IV acid-rain trading
program (a highly prescriptive regulatory program that Congress wrote
into the text of the CAA).66
Under the Obama Administration, the EPA promulgated the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (the “Cross-State Rule”), which sought
to remedy the flaws the D.C. Circuit identified in the Interstate Rule.67
The Cross-State Rule included an intricate, four-part science-based test
through which the EPA allocated emissions budgets to each state, using
federal implementation plans to establish each state’s emissionsreductions requirements.68 The Cross-State Rule was even more
complex than the Interstate Rule. It included a mechanism that allowed
pollution sources to rely on interstate trading while maintaining statespecific emissions budgets.69 The program also specified four different
regional trading markets, covered two different pollutants, and operated
through both annual and seasonal budgets for each pollutant.70 The
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Cross-State Rule as a proper
exercise of EPA’s authority under CAA § 110.71
The elevation of empiricism common across the CAA’s standardsetting provisions spurred the progressive interpretation supporting the
Interstate and Cross-State rules. Although interstate air pollution
presented a more complex challenge than Congress likely recognized
when it drafted the CAA, the EPA interpreted its authority under the
CAA as suitable for solving the problem, as the Agency understood it.72
Through rigorous analysis of a broad range of scientific research, the
EPA understood that pollutants emitted in large quantities and
transported over long distances contributed significantly to air-quality
problems in local air sheds. The EPA recognized that fossil-fuel-fired
power plants were substantially responsible for that problem and that
significantly cutting their emissions would improve downwind air

65.

Id. at 906 (“North Carolina challenges the lawfulness of CAIR’s trading
programs for SO2 and NOx. North Carolina contests the lack of reasonable
measures in CAIR to assure that upwind states will abate their unlawful
emissions . . . but does not submit that any trading is per se unlawful.”).

66.

See id. at 902–03, 929–30.

67.

Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,207 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97).

68.

See Wisconsin v. EPA, 938 F.3d 303, 309–12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (describing
the components of CSAPR).

69.

Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,209–16.

70.

Id. at 48,246–52.

71.

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 524 (2014).

72.

Id. at 495–505.
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quality.73 Since acid deposition was also the result of the long-range
transport of pollution, the EPA followed Congress’s lead and identified
the multi-state cap-and-trade model as highly effective for addressing
long-range pollution transport, which degraded downwind air quality.74
The EPA used this analysis to give meaning to the terms “adequate
provision” and “contributes significantly,” intertwining statutory
interpretation, empirical analysis, and fact-finding.75
The Bush EPA pioneered a similar expansiveness in the
interpretation of its authority under CAA § 111 (standards of
performance for new and existing stationary sources), which contains
the following provisions:
(a)(1): The term “standard of performance” means a standard for
emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system
of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and
environmental impact and energy requirements) the
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.76
...
(d)(1): The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall
establish a procedure similar to that provided by [§ 110] under
which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which
. . . establishes standards of performance for any existing source
for any air pollutant . . . .77

Building on the Interstate Rule, the Bush EPA implemented the
Clean Air Mercury Rule (the “Mercury Rule”), which interpreted the
phrase “best system of emission reduction” in CAA § 111(a)(1) as
authorizing the Agency to design a nationwide emissions-trading
program for power plant mercury emissions.78 In the final rule
promulgating the cap-and-trade program, the Agency explained:
73.

See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 902–03 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at 901–05.

76.

Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis
added).

77.

Id. § 111(d).

78.

The Clean Air Mercury Rule states:
The term “standard of performance” is not explicitly defined to
include or exclude an emissions cap and allowance trading
program. In the final rule, EPA interprets the term “standard of
performance,” as applied to existing sources, to include a capand-trade program . . . . A requirement for a cap-and-trade
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The term “standard of performance” is not explicitly defined to
include or exclude an emissions cap and allowance trading
program. . . . EPA interprets the term “standard of performance”
as applied to existing sources, to include a cap-and-tradeprogram. This interpretation is supported by a careful reading of
the section 111(a) definition of the term . . . .79

The EPA then determined that a cap-and-trade program, as
opposed to a technology-performance standard under § 112, represented
“the best system of emissions reductions” for curbing mercury pollution.
Ultimately, the EPA garnered significant criticism for the Mercury
Rule’s substantive qualities, as well as for the rule-making process
leading to the final rule.80 The D.C. Circuit struck down the final rule,
but it did so without reaching issues related specifically to the Agency’s
interpretation of § 111(a).81
Like the Interstate Rule (in the case of CAA § 110(a)(2)(D) and
(c)(1)), the Mercury Rule anticipated, to an extent, the Obama EPA’s
program (i) constitutes a “standard for emissions of air
pollutants;” (i.e., a rule for air emissions), (ii) “which reflects the
degree of emission limitation achievable” (i.e., which requires an
amount of emissions reductions that can be achieved), (iii)
“through application of (a) * * * system of emission reduction”
(i.e., in this case, a cap-and-trade program that caps allowances
at a level lower than current emissions).
Clean Air Mercury Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,616 (May 18, 2005) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. 60, 72, and 75) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-294,
at 195 (1977)).
79.

Id.

80.

See Andrew Carter, Alchemical Rulemaking and Ideological Framing:
Lessons from the 40-Year Battle to Regulate Mercury Emissions from
Electric Power Plants, 58 Nat. Resources J. 125, 158 (2018) (“Members
of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee were suspicious
of the process resulting in the 2004 Proposed CAMR, and requested
analyses of the proposed rule from EPA’s Office of Inspector General
(OIG), and from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), both of
which released reports highly critical of the Proposed CAMR and the
process by which it was created.”).

81.

The court struck down the Delisting Rule, which removed coal and oilfired power plants from the list of sources whose emissions are regulated
under § 112—a prerequisite to implementing the CAMR. See New Jersey
v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583–84 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 2008) (“EPA thus
concedes that if EGUs remain listed under section 112, as we hold, then
the CAMR regulations for existing sources must fall. EPA promulgated
the CAMR regulations for new sources under section 111(b) on the basis
that there would be no section 112 regulation of EGU emissions and that
the new source performance standards would be accompanied by a
national emissions cap and a voluntary cap-and-trade program. Given
that these vital assumptions were incorrect, the court must vacate
CAMR’s new source performance standards and remand them to EPA for
reconsideration . . . .”) (citations omitted).
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interpretation of § 111(d) and the definition of “best system of emissions
reduction.”82 When the Obama EPA began constructing the Clean
Power Plan, the Agency again engaged in an empirical investigation to
give meaning to “best system of emission reduction.” Section 111(d) of
the CAA requires that states submit plans establishing “standards of
performance” for power plants,83 with “standards of performance”
defined as standards reflecting the “best system of emission
reduction.”84 Pursuant to the President’s instruction, the Agency
undertook a robust process of public engagement to determine the “best
system of emission reduction” and to develop guidelines for how states
should establish standards of performance for power plant carbondioxide emissions under § 111(d).85 The EPA acquired extensive
information and observed that the demands of the networked electricity
grid dictated the operation of power plants. Specifically, it found that
shifting electricity generation from higher-emitting to lower-emitting
sources was a well-established, widely used strategy within the power
sector for complying with pollution-control programs.86 The EPA then
issued guidelines that offered states a broad menu of standard-setting
options so that power plant-emissions standards fully reflected the
EPA’s determination that generation-shifting constituted the best
system of emission reduction. In doing so, the EPA rejected a reading
of § 111(d) that would bar states from adopting standards that
encompassed generation-shifting.87 Instead, the Agency recognized that,
since there were a variety of ways in which states could define standards
of performance, the statute conferred on states sufficient flexibility to
82.

See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661
(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

83.

Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(l)(1) (2018).

84.

Id. § 111(a)(1).

85.

Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 2013 Daily
Comp. Pres. Doc. 457 (June 25, 2013).

86.

See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,728–29 (“As
described in section V.D. below, analysis reflecting consideration of the
many comments we received on the EPA’s proposal with respect to this
issue supports the inclusion of generation shifting from higher-emitting to
lower-emitting EGUs as a component of the BSER. Shifting of generation
among EGUs is an everyday occurrence within the integrated operations
of the utility power sector . . . .”).

87.

See id. at 64,752 (“Under section 111(d), states determine the standards
of performance for individual sources. The EPA is authorizing states to
express the standards of performance applicable to affected EGUs as
either emission rate-based limits or mass-based limits. As described above,
the sets of actions that sources can take to comply with these standards
implement or apply the BSER and, in that sense, may be understood as
part of the BSER.”).
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set standards that matched the EPA’s determination of the “best
system of emission reduction.”88
The Cross-State Rule and the Clean Power Plan illustrate an
additional aspect of the CAA’s progressive character. The same
provision requiring periodic review of technology standards, Section
111, requires that those standards reflect the “best system of emission
reduction” as determined by the EPA Administrator.89 Making that
determination is an inherently empirical exercise. Like other CAA
provisions, the language of Section 111 conveys a directive to search for
new information to provide the answer to a question. It does not convey
an inherent, static meaning that can be determined solely through
textual analysis. Rather, the language must be interpreted to reflect or
incorporate the empirical results of the Agency’s investigation.
C.

Judicial Backing of a Progressive Clean Air Act

The judiciary has consistently found that Congress gave the EPA
the authority to continually address previously unknown air-quality
problems.90 This has remained true for the nearly three decades that
have passed since the most recent CAA amendments. Recent decisions
on the merits by the Supreme Court, in particular, and lower courts,
continue to back this progressive understanding of the CAA’s logic. The
Court’s endorsement is most apparent in the seminal case
Massachusetts v. EPA,91 which challenged the Bush Administration’s
determination that it lacked the authority under the CAA to regulate
greenhouse-gas-tailpipe emissions.92 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens explained Congress’s awareness that only through enacting a
statute that tracked scientific progress would Congress be able to
empower the EPA to face the nation’s air-quality challenges:
While the Congress that drafted § 202(a)(1) might not have
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to
global warming, they did understand that without regulatory
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad

88.

See id. at 64,667 (“In developing plans, states will need to choose the type
of plan they will develop. . . . This final rule includes several options for
state plans . . . .”).

89.

Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1).

90.

See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 777 F.3d 456, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
promulgates National Ambient Air Quality Standards for air
pollutants.”).

91.

549 U.S. 497 (2007).

92.

Id. at 505.
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language of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the
flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.93

Justice Stevens underscores the importance of reading dynamically
the CAA so as to not make such a broad and ambitious statute
“obsolete.” Ultimately, even though the Court acknowledged that
Congress did not specifically contemplate applying the CAA to
greenhouse gas emissions, it rejected the EPA’s denial of its own
statutory power.94 Instead, it held that the CAA required the EPA to
treat greenhouse gases as air pollutants, as defined by the statute, to
determine whether they presented a threat to public health or the
environment, and if so, to use the tools Congress granted the Agency
to regulate air pollution.95
Similarly, in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., the
Supreme Court upheld the Cross-State Rule.96 In that rule, the EPA
promulgated both emissions budgets for each upwind state and federal
implementation plans that applied those budgets to affected states after
finding that the states themselves failed to promulgate adequate plans.97
The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule, in part finding, without identifying
any statutory basis for its conclusion, that the EPA needed to allow
states extra time to develop implementation plans following the EPA’s
promulgation of the emissions budgets.98 The Supreme Court
overturned the D.C. Circuit, noting that “the statute speaks without
reservation” regarding what it requires of the EPA.99 Writing for the
majority, Justice Ginsburg scolded the D.C. Circuit for “stretch[ing]
out” the statute’s implementation process: “[The D.C. Circuit] allowed
a delay Congress did not order and placed an information submission
on [the] EPA Congress did not impose. The D.C. Circuit . . . had no
warrant thus to revise the CAA’s action-ordering prescriptions.”100 The
Court thus interprets the Act’s “action-ordering prescriptions” as
93.

Id. at 532.

94.

Id. at 529–30.

95.

Id. at 528–30; see also William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation
in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 Duke L.J. 1509, 1582 (2019) (“Both in
its discussion of standing and its overall construction of the statute, the
Court mandated that the agency undertake whatever actions Congress
had required based on the statutory criteria, even if regulation would
represent only an incremental step toward a larger goal.”).

96.

572 U.S. 489, 524 (2014).

97.

Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97).

98.

EME Homer City Generation L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 37 (D.C. Cir.
2012).

99.

Id. at 509.

100. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
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authorizing the EPA to implement a far-reaching, complex program
based on a mandate for “adequate provisions” to address the significant
contribution of upwind states’ pollution on downwind air quality.101
The judiciary has also upheld the Agency’s responsibility to meet
Congress’s ambition for widespread dissemination of leading pollutioncontrol technology, even when the EPA itself shies away from that
responsibility.102 In 2018, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the EPA’s
establishment of Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT)
standards for emissions from newly constructed brick kilns.103 MACT
standards are set by identifying the best performing existing sources
and establishing a floor—or minimum stringency requirement—at or
above which the EPA must set the final standards.104 The EPA’s brick
kiln MACT rule allowed pollution sources to choose between three
emissions limits, expressed in different measurement units, all of which
the EPA defined as representing the “best” performing sources.105 The
EPA intended to offer polluters compliance flexibility, arguing that
each pollution sources’ ability to comply differed based on how pollution
was measured.106 The D.C. Circuit held that while the EPA could
choose the proper unit of measurement, its “discretion [did] not extend
to defining several different ‘best’ metrics within the same category and
allowing emitters to comply with the most favorable standard.”107 The
EPA could not contradict the statute’s clear language inducing
dissemination of advanced pollution-control technology.
Similarly, in New York v. EPA,108 the D.C. Circuit invalidated an
EPA rule that allowed facilities to avoid more stringent regulations for
modified pollution sources by broadening the routine maintenancerepair-and-replacement exclusion to include non-de minimis mod–
ifications.109 Under the CAA’s New Source Review program, when a
pollution source’s emissions will increase because of a modification, it
must meet stringent pollution-control requirements.110 Although the
EPA has historically excluded de minimis component part replacements
from triggering the review program, it finalized a rule in 2003 that
categorically excluded replacements under a certain value without
101. Id. at 499.
102. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 895 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
103. Id. at 7–8.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15–16.
108. 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
109. Id. at 890.
110. Id. at 883.
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considering the resulting emissions change.111 The court reasoned that
this exclusion contradicted the statute’s intent:
Given Congress’s goal . . . of establishing a balance between
economic and environmental interests, it is hardly “farfetched,”
for Congress to have intended [New Source Review] to apply to
any type of physical change that increases emissions. . . . [The]
EPA’s interpretation would produce a “strange,” if not an
“indeterminate,” result: a law intended to limit increases in air
pollution would allow sources operating below applicable
emissions limits to increase significantly the pollution they emit
without government review.112

The D.C. Circuit made clear that the EPA could not provide flexibility
to regulated industry if doing so would contradict the CAA’s pollutioncontrol purpose.113
At times, the Supreme Court has allowed the EPA to use its
expansive authority to design flexible compliance mechanisms for
industry or it has cabined the EPA’s authority. These cases are not
counter to a progressive reading of the statute. In Utility Air Regulatory
Group (UARG) v. EPA,114 the Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s
regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions from pollution sources already
within the CAA’s permitting program, while invalidating only the
section that made greenhouse-gas emissions a trigger for additional
permitting requirements under the Act.115 The rule in question in
UARG would have required CAA permits, solely based on carbon
dioxide emissions, for thousands of entities never before subject to
permitting requirements.116 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
distinguished between the statutory text in the permit-triggering
provisions117 and that in the provision applicable to already-regulated
sources.118 According to Justice Scalia, the “breadth” of the phrase “any
air pollutant” in the permit-triggering provision did not allow a

111. Id.
112. Id. at 886 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 889–90.
114. 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
115. Id. at 333–34.
116. Id. at 332.
117. Id. at 316–17 (describing the EPA’s historic interpretation of “any air
pollutant” in the Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions and
Title V).
118. Id. at 329 (“To obtain a PSD permit, a source must be ‘subject to the
best available control technology’ for ‘each pollutant subject to regulation
under [the Act]’ that it emits.”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (1976)
(alteration in original)).
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“transformative expansion in [the] EPA’s regulatory authority.”119 At
the same time, he interpreted the statute’s language mandating that
permitting requirements apply to “each pollutant subject to regulation
under this chapter,” as compelling the EPA to impose pollution-control
requirements on already-regulated sources.120
Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Scalia’s decision in UARG is an
enlightening example of a progressive reading of the CAA. It does not
afford the Agency unlimited discretion but rather recognizes Congress’s
intention for the EPA to address previously unknown problems in a
“context-appropriate”121 manner that aligns with the statute’s
mandates. When the EPA oversteps and attempts to rewrite the statute
to significantly expand its authority, the Court invalidates the rule. But
when the EPA accepts its statutory mandate and regulates greenhouse
gases from already-regulated sources, the Court upholds the program
as a reasonable interpretation of the CAA given the new realities
revealed by science.
In the same vein, the Court in Michigan v. EPA122 required the
EPA to consider costs when making an “appropriate and necessary”
determination for regulating hazardous air-pollutant emissions from
power plants.123 At issue in Michigan was CAA § 112(n)(1)(A), which
requires the EPA to study available pollution-control technology and
the public-health impacts of power plants’ hazardous air pollutant
emissions after other CAA programs are implemented and to determine,
based on the results of that inquiry, whether it is “appropriate and
necessary” to regulate those emissions.124 In making its initial
appropriate-and-necessary determination in 2012, the EPA did not
consider the cost of regulation.125 While the Court invalidated this
approach, it also expressly stated that it was entirely up to the Agency
119. Id. at 324, 331–32.
120. Id. at 331–32 (“Whereas the dubious breadth of ‘any air pollutant’ in the
permitting triggers suggests a role for agency judgment in identifying the
subset of pollutants covered by the particular regulatory program at issue,
the more specific phrasing of the [Best Available Control Technology
(BACT)] provision suggests that the necessary judgment has already been
made by Congress. The wider statutory context likewise does not suggest
that the BACT provision can bear a narrowing construction: There is no
indication that the Act elsewhere uses, or that EPA has interpreted, ‘each
pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter’ to mean anything other
than what it says.”).
121. Id. at 317 (“It takes some cheek for EPA to insist that it cannot possibly
give ‘air pollutant’ a reasonable, context-appropriate meaning in the PSD
and Title V contexts when it has been doing precisely that for decades.”).
122. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
123. Id. at 2711.
124. Id. at 2705.
125. Id.
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to determine the proper method for cost consideration.126 By stopping
short of prescribing a strict cost–benefit analysis, the Court did not
corner the EPA into concluding that such regulation was not
appropriate if it did not find that benefits outweighed costs. With this
judgment, the Court preserved the EPA’s authority to carry out
Congress’s clear intent of ensuring that hazardous air-pollutant
emissions from power plants were reduced—either as a result of
compliance with other CAA programs or through regulation under §
112.
The judiciary’s limitations on the EPA’s authority, which tend to
focus on the manner in which the EPA exercises that authority, do not
undermine the generally progressive interpretation of the CAA. On the
whole, the courts have upheld this understanding, expecting the Agency
to address newly discovered air-quality challenges in a manner that
reflects advancements in science and technology.127

II. The Trump Administration’s Actions to Restrict
the Agency’s Authority
The Trump EPA is using its regulatory rollbacks to limit its
statutory authority to effectively confront current and future air
pollution challenges. Rather than deregulating by changing its policy
judgments to favor compliance flexibility or more lenient emissions
126. Id. at 2711.
127. This observation remained true at least until February 9, 2016, when the
Supreme Court, without issuing an opinion on the merits, stayed the
Clean Power Plan. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). A
unanimous three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had
denied West Virginia’s motion for a stay. See Order Denying Motion for
Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016);
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that that the Clean Power Plan was an
unlawful transformation of the EPA’s statutory authority and that §
111(d) unambiguously precluded the Agency from requiring generation
shifting. Reply Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 1, 3, 12, West
Virginia v. EPA, No. 15–1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016). The Trump EPA
adopted these arguments in its Repeal of the Clean Power Plan. EPA,
Fact Sheet: Repeal of the Clean Power Plan (2019), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-06/documents/cpp_
repeal_fact_sheet_6.18.19_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG2N-A3HB].
In Mexichem Flour v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017) then-Judge
Kavanagh, writing for a split panel, vacated an EPA rule regulating
hydrofluorocarbons. Id. at 454. The majority’s analysis, relying on
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary for its statutory interpretation, rejected an
interpretation of the Clean Air Act § 612, which the EPA had taken to
mean that Congress intended the Agency to periodically update the list
of approved and disapproved hydrofluorocarbon substitutes as new
chemicals when improved environmental impacts became available. Id. at
458–59.
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requirements, the Administration is attempting to undermine the
EPA’s ability to progressively implement the statute by offering
interpretations that read out of the statute its progressive elements.
The Administration is pursuing this mission through two general
methods. First, the Trump EPA is imposing a static interpretation of
the statutory text to curtail its overall power to regulate.128 This
strategy interprets the statute in a narrow way, allowing the EPA to
ignore current science and technological capabilities, and shielding it
from the obligation to effectively mitigate harmful air pollution. Second,
the EPA is increasing its use of disaggregation of air pollution, pollution
sources, and regulatory benefits in order to find that further regulation
is unwarranted or to extend and delay the regulatory process.129 By
arbitrarily separating the various aspects of air-pollution control, the
Agency attenuates its regulatory authority to justify its own
deregulation. The following four regulatory developments exemplify the
Trump Administration’s efforts to counter a progressive reading of the
statute and integrate these longer-term deregulatory strategies into
CAA rulemaking. In two of the relevant rollbacks, the EPA has
acknowledged that its proposed changes would have little impact on
emissions levels, begging the question of why the Agency would pursue
such rollbacks if not for the broader agenda of novel legal
interpretations that would unravel its regulatory authority.130
A.

The Affordable Clean Energy Rule

The EPA’s legal justification for repealing the Obama
Administration’s Clean Power Plan and promulgating the Affordable
Clean Energy Rule (ACE) relies on a static interpretation of the CAA
that bars the EPA from taking account of the realities of the electricity
grid.131 In the final rules repealing the Clean Power Plan and
promulgating ACE, the EPA interprets the standard of performance
that applies throughout CAA § 111(d)—the “best system of emissions
reduction”—as encompassing only site-specific pollution controls for
power plant emissions.132 This ignores the realities of power plant
operations. In the Clean Power Plan, the EPA used a robust factual
record to determine that the best system of emission reduction for coaland natural-gas-fired power plants included generation shifting from
128. Joseph Goffman & Caitlin McCoy, EPA’s House of Cards: The
Affordable Clean Energy Rule 10–11 (2019).
129. See generally Buzbee, supra note 95.
130. Goffman & McCoy, supra note 128, at 16.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520,
32,523 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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coal-fired sources to natural-gas and renewable-energy sources, and
from natural-gas-fired sources to renewable-energy sources.133 Yet the
Trump EPA’s interpretation would prohibit the Agency from adopting
this broader, more effective understanding of Section 111(a)(1) and (d)
when determining the best system of emission reduction. The final rule
states that “CAA section 111 unambiguously limits the [best system of
emissions reduction] to those systems that can be put into operation at
a building, structure, facility, or installation. Such systems include, for
example, add-on controls (e.g., scrubbers) and inherently loweremitting processes/practices/designs.”134 The rule does not include
shifting power generation from higher- to lower-emitting pollution
sources, notwithstanding that generation-shifting is a mainstay of
power plants’ compliance with a number of other pollution-control
programs. ACE also decreases both implementation flexibility for states
and compliance flexibility for pollution sources by prohibiting reliance
on any but the narrow menu of options listed in the rule.135
Rather than interpreting the CAA’s broad language as providing
the EPA with the tools to adequately curb coal-fired power plant
emissions, the Trump Administration adopts a statutory interpretation
that turns Section 111 into a self-contradicting provision: after following
the CAA’s requirement to identify the full set of options for reducing
emissions, the EPA must select only the least effective options. The
EPA’s interpretation curtails its own and states’ authority to issue
guidelines and set emissions standards that reflect the Agency’s
thorough assessment of how power plants operate in determining the
best system of emission reduction. That, in turn, takes away the
Agency’s capacity to regulate effectively. This process is counter to a
progressive reading of the Act, which would compel the EPA to fully
examine the changing circumstances and implement the statutory
provision accordingly.
In contrast to the Clean Power Plan, ACE appears to serve a
purpose unrelated to the CAA’s emissions-reduction purpose. Indeed,
the EPA’s analysis shows that ACE will achieve virtually no reductions

133. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,665 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40. C.F.R. pt. 60) (“The result of our following
Congress’ recognition of the interdependent operation of [electric
generating units] within an interconnected grid is the incorporation in the
[Best System of Emissions Reduction] of measures, such as shifting
generation to lower-emitting [natural gas combined cycle] units and
increased use of [renewable energy], that rely on current interdependent
operation of [electric generating units].”).
134. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,524.
135. See Goffman & McCoy, supra note 128.
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in carbon dioxide emissions.136 In repealing the Clean Power Plan, the
EPA relies entirely on its claim that the relevant language in CAA §
111 is unambiguous.137 Should the EPA prevail on this argument in
litigation challenging the rule, it will establish a precedent barring
future administrations from reinterpreting Section 111 more broadly.138
This appears to be the EPA’s ultimate goal, and the Agency is taking
an avoidable litigation risk to achieve it.
Unlike the Trump EPA, agencies often seek deference from courts
for reasonable interpretations of their statutes, rather than advancing
solely the argument that a statute is unambiguously clear. The
framework for seeking judicial deference was established in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.139 Following
Chevron, courts use a two-step process to determine whether to uphold
an agency’s statutory interpretation. The first step is to determine
whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
If it has, and the agency’s definition “give[s] effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress,”140 then the court will defer to the
agency’s interpretation. If the statute is ambiguous, then courts proceed
to step two, where they will defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is
“a permissible construction of the statute.”141 Step two is more favorable
for agencies, as it requires the court to ask only whether the
interpretation is reasonable. The Trump Administration, however, has
offered no Chevron-step-two argument in ACE. Instead, the EPA
states:
The definition of ‘standard of performance,’ and the scope of the
‘best system of emission reduction” contained within, confers
considerable discretion on the EPA to interpret the statute and
make reasonable policy choices pursuant to Chevron step two as
to what is the best system to reduce emissions of a particular
pollutant from a particular type of source. However, by making
136. Office of Air Quality Planning & Standards, EPA, Regulatory
Impact Analysis for the Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, and
the Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units 3–11 (2019) (estimating
less than a 1% reduction in carbon-dioxide emissions).
137. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,524, 32,529, 32,570.
138. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X, 545 U.S.
967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps
an agency construction otherwise entitle to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.”).
139. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). An argument that the statute is unambiguous need
not be considered under the Chevron framework.
140. Id. at 842–43.
141. Id. at 843.
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clear that the ‘application’ of the [best system of emissions
reduction] must be to the source, Congress spoke directly in
Chevron step one terms to the question of whether the [best system
of emissions reduction] may contain measures other than those
that can be put into operation at a particular source: It may not.
The approach to the [best system of emissions reduction] in the
[Clean Power Plan] is thus unlawful and the [Clean Power Plan]
must be repealed.142

Given the breadth of “best system of emissions reduction,” the fact
that standards of performance can be defined in a variety of ways, and
the flexibility of the state–federal partnership structure of Section
111(d), the EPA took a legal risk by insisting that the applicable
statutory language is unambiguous. It could have mitigated that risk
by offering an additional argument that the Agency’s interpretation
was reasonable and therefore entitled to the court’s deference under the
Chevron framework even if the court concluded the statute was
ambiguous.143 The D.C. Circuit will hear the pending challenges to the
repeal of the Clean Power Plan and ACE. Unlike other federal circuit
courts, which will uphold agency interpretations if they infer that they
are reasonable, the D.C. Circuit tends to afford deference to agencies
only when they explicitly make a Chevron-step-two argument to
supplement their claims that the statute is unambiguous.144
EPA’s foregoing a step-two argument suggests that it is willing to
risk the court remanding both the repeal of the Clean Power Plan and
ACE for the chance to secure a binding judicial decision restricting the
Agency’s legal authority.145 If the EPA were to prevail against a
challenge only under a Chevron-step-two argument, a future admin–
istration could reinterpret the statute to encompass a broader type of
performance standards and defend that interpretation as a permissible
alternative reading of the statute. If the EPA wins with an argument
that the statute is unambiguous, however, a future administration
would be precluded from interpreting the statute more broadly or from
arguing in litigation that the statutory language is ambiguous. The
EPA adopted a narrow interpretation of the statute not just for the
purpose of rolling back a single Obama Administration rule, but also,

142. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,532 (emphasis added).
143. For a longer analysis of the EPA’s legal strategy in ACE, and its
shortcomings given the D.C. Circuit’s approach to Chevron review, see
Goffman & McCoy, supra note 128. See generally Buzbee, supra note
95, at 1562 (“[T]he self-constraining agency that relies on a statutoryabnegation claim heightens risks of judicial reversal and also limits its
future flexibility.”).
144. See Goffman & McCoy, supra note 128, at 6–7.
145. See id. at 8.
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it seems, to garner a lasting restriction on the EPA’s power to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants.
B.

Withdrawal of California’s Waiver for Automotive Emissions
Standards

In 2019, the EPA revoked California’s waiver to enforce the state’s
vehicle-emissions standards by yielding regulatory authority to another
agency and, in the alternative, adopting a narrow interpretation of the
CAA that separates conventional pollutants and greenhouse gases and
defies the Act’s technology-innovation imperative.146 The CAA
establishes a national program to set emissions standards for motor
vehicles, generally preempting the states’ rights to set state-specific
standards.147 Section 209(b)(1), however, permits California to request
a preemption waiver from the EPA to set more stringent vehicle
emissions standards,148 and Section 177 allows other states to adopt
California’s standards approved under the waiver provision.149 The
statute creates a presumption for granting California a waiver, as
Congress explicitly stated that the EPA “shall . . . waive application of
this section” unless it makes one of three findings to deny a waiver.150
One of those findings is that California “does not need such State
standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.”151
In an unprecedented action, the Trump EPA withdrew the waiver
it previously granted to California for the regulation of greenhouse-gas
emissions and its zero-emissions-vehicle (ZEV) program.152 The EPA
included two alternative justifications for this action: (1) that, per a
determination made by the National Highway Traffic Safety
146. Trump Administration Announces One National Program Rule on
Federal Preemption of State Fuel Economy Standards, EPA (Sept. 19,
2019), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/trump-administration-announcesone-national-program-rule-federal-preemption-state-fuel [https://perma.cc/
K98X-C8R8].
147. Clean Air Act §§ 202(a)(1), 209(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521, 7543 (2018).
148. Id. § 209(b)(1).
149. Id. § 177.
150. Id. § 209(b)(1) (“No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator
finds that—(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious,
(B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling
and extraordinary conditions, or (C) such State standards and accompanying
enforcement procedures are not consistent with [§ 202(a)].”).
151. Id. § 209(b)(1)(B).
152. Juliet Eilperin & Brandy Dennis, Trump Administration to Revoke
California’s Power to Set Stricter Auto Emissions Standards, Wash. Post
(Sept. 17, 2019, 9:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/trump-administration-to-revoke-californias-power-to-setstricter-auto-emmissions-standards/2019/09/17/79af2ee0-d97b-11e9-a688303693fb4b0b_story.html [https://perma.cc/RD6P-QVMN].
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Administration (NHTSA), the standards were preempted by the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which governs fuel
economy standards;153 and (2) that CAA § 209(b)(1)(B), as the EPA
now interprets it, does not apply to greenhouse gases because
California’s standards are not needed to meet extraordinary
conditions.154
The EPA ceded its air-quality-related authority by noting the
NHTSA’s determination that EPCA preempts California’s tailpipeemissions regulations regardless of the prerogative afforded the state
under the CAA. The NHTSA establishes nationwide fuel-economy
standards for motor vehicles under EPCA, which preempts state and
local laws that are “related to fuel economy standards.”155 Because
automakers generally comply with lower carbon-dioxide-emissions
limits by increasing fuel economy, the NHTSA concluded that
California’s greenhouse-gas-emission standards are “related to fuel
economy standards” and thus preempted by EPCA.156 The EPA
adopted the NHTSA’s reasoning and relied on its preemption
determination as an independent basis to withdraw California’s
waiver157:
Considering that California cannot enforce standards that are
void ab initio, even assuming arguendo that there existed a valid
grant of waiver under CAA section 209(b), [the] NHTSA’s
determination renders [the] EPA’s prior grant of a waiver for
those aspects of California’s regulations that EPCA preempts
invalid, null, and void . . . [the] EPA hereby withdraws the prior
grant of a waiver on this basis.158

The EPA departed from precedent and abandoned its CAA
obligations and authority under Section 209 without undertaking the
analysis Congress mandated.159 In contrast to the EPA’s interpretation
in ACE to narrow its authority, here the Agency abdicated its authority
entirely. The result is to stymie the continual development and
deployment of innovative technology, which is one of the CAA’s
153. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One
National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,338 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85 and 86).
154. Id. at 51,328.
155. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018); see also SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84
Fed. Reg. at 51,312 (explaining the NHTSA’s implementation of the
EPCA).
156. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,313.
157. Id. at 51,314.
158. Id. at 51,338.
159. See id. at 51,339−44 (interpreting the text of § 209 to not require the indepth analysis that Congress demanded).

955

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020
Disempowering the EPA

foundational imperatives. By revoking California’s waiver, the EPA is
impeding the progress of advanced automotive technology that
eliminates greenhouse-gas emissions and pollutant emissions that
directly harm air quality and public health. As the Supreme Court
noted in Massachusetts v. EPA,160 just because the Department of
Transportation “sets mileage standards in no way licenses [the] EPA to
shirk its environmental responsibilities. [The] EPA has been charged
with protecting the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare.’”161 In its 2019
revocation of California’s waiver, the EPA does little to explain why
the it and the NHTSA cannot both administer their respective
obligations while avoiding inconsistency. The EPA also does little to
explain why it accepts the NHTSA’s position on the ZEV component
of California’s program, which has the greatest impact on local air
quality.
In the alternative, the Trump EPA interprets CAA §§ 209(b)(1)(B)
and 177 as narrowly applying only to criteria pollutants,162 not
greenhouse gases. The EPA first determines that “it is appropriate to
review California’s [greenhouse gas] standards separately from the
remainder of the State’s motor vehicle emission control program for
purposes of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B).”163 By separating greenhouse
gases from conventional pollutant emissions, the EPA positions itself to
defend its conclusion that the statute does not authorize California to
regulate greenhouse gases. The EPA then concludes that “[i]n order for
a waiver request to pass muster under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) . . . a
particularized, state-specific nexus must exist between sources of
pollutants, resulting pollution, and impacts of that pollution.”164 The
EPA’s new interpretation narrows the CAA’s broad language of
“compelling and extraordinary conditions” to restrict it from applying
to global pollutants like greenhouse gases, regardless of their unique
impact on California. In contrast, in 2013, the EPA concluded that
“[t]his single [Advanced Clean Cars] program combines the control of
smog-causing pollutants and [greenhouse gas] emissions into a
coordinated package of amendments and requirements . . . to address
near and long term smog issues within California and identified

160. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
161. Id. at 532.
162. Criteria pollutants are the six pervasive air pollutants regulated under the
NAAQS program: carbon monoxide, ground level ozone, nitrogen dioxide,
sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and lead. NAAQS Table, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table [https://perma.cc/
2TSB-TEJW] (last updated Dec. 20, 2016).
163. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,347.
164. Id. at 51,348.
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[greenhouse gas] emission reduction goals.”165 Trump’s EPA is choosing
to ignore the connections between greenhouse gas emissions, climate
change, and California’s air-quality challenges. The EPA now separates
conventional pollutants and greenhouse gases, and reads Section
209(b)(1)(B) in a static manner that defeats the CAA’s technologyinnovation imperative, which is equally applicable to greenhouse gas
and conventional pollutant emissions under the California’s ZEV
program.
The Trump EPA goes one step further and constrains the
technology-dissemination aspect of Section 177 by finding that other
states cannot use that section to adopt California’s greenhouse gas
standards or ZEV programs:
[T]he text, placement in Title I, and relevant legislative history
are all indicative that CAA section 177 is in fact intended for
NAAQS attainment planning and not to address global air
pollution. . . . This construct also comports with our reading of
CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) as limiting applicability of CAA
section 209(b) waiver authority to state programs that address
pollutants that affect local or regional air quality and not those
relating to global air pollution like GHGs.166

By making this determination, the EPA is blocking the
dissemination of effective pollution-control technology, including
innovation through the ZEV program, which addresses both NAAQS
attainment and climate pollution. The Agency is frustrating the role
that Congress intended California and the states to play. The EPA’s
definitive statement is indicative of its new perspective on the CAA,
alleging that it neither was written to address unknown challenges like
climate change nor does it compel the Agency to undertake the most
effective means of improving air quality. By engineering an
interpretation that ignores the local impact and sources of greenhouse
gas emissions, the EPA once again constrains the Agency’s and states’
authority to act under the CAA.
C.

Reversal of the Appropriate and Necessary Finding for the Mercury
and Air Toxics Standards

The Trump EPA’s reversal of the Agency’s previous finding—that
it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate mercury emissions from

165. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Advanced Clean Car Program and a Within the Scope Confirmation for
California’s Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for 2017 and Earlier
Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112, 2114 (Jan. 9, 2013).
166. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,351.
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power plants167—reads into the CAA a limitation on the Agency’s
authority and something akin to a loophole in the CAA’s mandate to
control mercury and other hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) from power
plants. Section 112(n)(1)(A) provides that the EPA must set pollutioncontrol standards for power plant HAP emissions if the Agency finds it
“appropriate and necessary” to do so following a study of
“the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur” from
such emissions after implementation of other CAA pollution-control
programs.168 In 2012, the EPA issued a final rule finding that it was
appropriate and necessary to regulate HAP emissions from power plants
and establishing pollution-control standards, known as the Mercury and
Air Toxic Standards (MATS).169 In the case challenging the final rule,
Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court considered whether it was
reasonable for the EPA to not consider costs when making its
appropriate-and-necessary determination.170 While the Court held that
the Agency must consider the costs of regulation as part of its
“appropriate” determination, it deferred to the EPA to decide the
proper way to consider costs.171 The Court did not mandate that the
EPA conduct a formal cost–benefit analysis, and the Court did not bar
an appropriate-and-necessary finding if the EPA found that the costs
of regulation outweighed the benefits.172 The EPA then issued a
supplemental finding in 2016, in which it considered costs and

167. The EPA originally issued an “appropriate and necessary” finding in 2000,
rescinded it in 2005, reinstated it in 2012, and finally issued a
supplemental finding in 2016, following the Supreme Court’s requirement
in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015), that the Agency
consider the costs of regulating as part of the “appropriate”
determination.
168. Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A).
169. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coaland Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-CommercialInstitutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
Generating Units, 77 Fed Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63).
170. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2699 (2015).
171. Id. at 2711 (“The Agency must consider cost—including, most
importantly, cost of compliance—before deciding whether regulation is
appropriate and necessary. We need not and do not hold that the law
unambiguously required the Agency, when making this preliminary
estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each
advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value. It will be up
to the Agency to decide (as always, within the limits of reasonable
interpretation) how to account for cost.”).
172. Id.
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confirmed
the
Agency’s
2012
appropriate-and-necessary
determination.173
In its 2016 supplemental finding, the EPA integrated the provisions
of Section 112(n)(1)(A) and the Supreme Court’s holding in Michigan
to carry out Congress’s intention that HAPs emitted by power plants
be substantially reduced.174 The EPA explained its preferred approach
to considering costs, stating that cost is “one of several factors that
must be considered and the statutory text [did] not support a conclusion
that cost should be the predominant or overriding factor.”175 The EPA
did not rely on a formal benefit–cost analysis because of Section 112’s
objectives, emphasis on the required studies, “Congress’[s]
determination that HAP emissions are inherently harmful, and the
instruction from Congress to protect the most sensitive populations
from those harms.”176 The EPA affirmed its 2012 appropriate-andnecessary finding, because mercury and other HAPs “pose hazards to
public health” and “because of [their] magnitude . . . environmental
effects . . . and the availability of controls to reduce HAP emissions
from [power plants].”177 By basing its conclusion on the emissions’
hazardous nature, EPA aligned its action with Section 112’s mandate.
Finally, the EPA concluded that it was “necessary” to regulate because
the hazards to public health from power plant HAP emissions were
reasonably anticipated to remain after the implementation of other
CAA provisions.178
Justice Kagan anticipated this approach in her dissent in Michigan
v. EPA, where she explained that Congress crafted Section 112’s
appropriate-and-necessary-determination requirement “because the
1990 amendments established a separate program to control power
plant emissions contributing to acid rain, and many thought that just
by complying with those requirements, plants might reduce their
emissions of hazardous air pollutants to acceptable levels.”179 As Justice
Kagan writes, “[t]hat prospect counseled a ‘wait and see’ approach,
under which [the] EPA would give the Act’s acid rain provisions a
chance to achieve that side benefit before imposing any further

173. Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
174. Id. at 24,420−21.
175. Id. at 24,424 (presenting the Agency’s view of the statutory scheme of
which § 112(n)(1)(A) is a part).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 24,423.
178. Id.
179. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2715 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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regulation.”180 She concluded that, following an appropriate-andnecessary determination, which was based on the emissions study
required by Section 112(n)(1)(A), the CAA dictates that the “EPA is
to regulate power plants as it does every other stationary source.”181
The EPA’s 2020 reversal, in contrast, adopts reasoning that treats
that imperative as optional, subject to the EPA’s application of a cost–
benefit analysis. EPA extends the holding in Michigan by narrowly
comparing the direct cost of compliance with the monetized benefits
from reductions in HAPs (minimizing all other real, but generally nonmonetizable benefits), and concludes that it is not appropriate and
necessary to regulate power plants under CAA §112(d).182 In so doing,
the EPA elevates the importance of cost and effectively erases from
Section 112(n)(1)(A) the express mandate to examine and to account
for the public health threat posed by power plant HAP. Neither Section
112(n)(1)(A) nor Michigan mandates that elevation; and, as Justice
Kagan’s dissent suggests, the EPA does not have that authority. By
combining a determination that Section 112(n)(1)(A) gives the EPA
the option not to regulate with an appropriate-and-necessary finding
based solely on a narrow cost–benefit comparison, the EPA essentially
concludes that the CAA allows the Agency to not regulate power plant
emissions under Section 112, even if it concludes that “hazards to public
health [are] reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by
[power plants]”—the original finding Congress required in the CAA.183
In the final rule, the Trump EPA downplays the role of
Congressional intent in carrying out the appropriate and necessary
finding. In response to comments received on the proposed rule, the
EPA states, “[w]e do not agree . . . that general congressional concern
180. Id. at 2715−16.
181. Id. at 2716.
182. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units-Reconsideration of
Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 85 Fed.
Reg. 31,286, 31,286 (May 22, 2020).
183. Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2018) (“The
Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public health
reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility
steam generating units . . . after imposition of the requirements of this
chapter. . . . The Administrator shall regulate electric utility steam
generating units under this section, if the Administrator finds such
regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the
study required by this subparagraph.”); cf. National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units—Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and
Residual Risk and Technology Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2676 (proposed
Feb. 7, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (“In this action, the
EPA proposes to conclude that it is not appropriate and necessary to
regulate HAP[s] from EGUs under CAA section 112 because the costs of
such regulation grossly outweigh the HAP benefits.”).
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about the toxicity of HAPs overrides the specific instruction given to
the Administrator in CAA section 112(n)(1)(A) to make a determin–
ation about whether regulation of [power plants] in particular is
‘appropriate and necessary.’”184 The EPA supports this argument by
relying on Congress’s intent that the EPA treat power plants
differently, given the acid rain provisions.185 But that argument ignores
the tight nexus between the results of the EPA’s study of hazardous air
emissions and the appropriate and necessary determination that
Congress created in Section 112(n)(1)(A).
Additionally, the 2020 finding rejects the standard approach to
cost–benefit analysis of calculating the benefits resulting from all
pollution reductions. This practice is widely supported by economists
and has been long endorsed by the Office of Management and Budget
and the EPA itself. 186 Instead, the EPA considers mainly the benefits
of reducing HAPs and down-weights important co-benefits, including
reducing particulate matter and sulfur dioxide.187 In the final rule, the
EPA argues that the CAA directs the EPA to focus on the benefits of
reducing HAPs and that OMB’s guidance cannot supersede this
statutory mandate.188 But the CAA’s text does not support this
conclusion. The standard approach of accounting for all benefits aligns
with the scientific understanding of the health impacts of air pollution
and the CAA’s progressive scientific imperatives.189 By abandoning the
184. Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding, 85 Fed. Reg. at 31,293.
185. Id. at 31,293–94 (“As the U.S. Supreme Court admonished the EPA in
Michigan, the text and structure of CAA section 112, and 112(n)(1)(A)
in particular, evince Congressional design to approach the question
whether to regulate EGUs differently than other source categories.”).
186. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President,
Circular A-4, at 26 (2003) (“Your analysis should look beyond the direct
benefits and direct costs of your rule-making and consider any important
ancillary benefits and countervailing risks.”).
187. Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding, 85 Fed. Reg at 31,301 (“CAA
section 112(n)(1)(A) requires a threshold determination of whether any
regulation of EGUs under CAA section 112 is ‘appropriate and necessary.’
The EPA believes that this inquiry must be focused primarily on the risks
posed by the pollutants targeted by CAA section 112, i.e., HAP emissions.
[…] While the Agency acknowledges that PM co- benefits are substantial,
the Agency cannot rely on PM co-benefits to supplant the primary factors
Congress directed the Administrator to consider.”).
188. Id. at 31,301 (“How costs are to be considered in making the
congressionally-directed CAA section 112(n)(1)(A) determination,
however, is not governed independent from statutory requirements, by
preexisting OMB or EPA guidelines, nor could it be.”).
189. As one commentator, Kathy Fallon Lambert, explains:
If the goal is to be protective of human health and ecosystem
health, you must consider the fact that we breathe air that
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Agency’s and the Executive Office of the President’s long-standing costbenefit methodology, the EPA aggravates its departure from the CAA’s
imperatives.
The EPA also disregards the CAA’s emphasis on scientific progress
by failing to update the value it attributes to reductions in mercury
emissions.190 In its cost–benefit analysis, the EPA uses the same benefits
value for mercury emissions reductions that it used in 2011, ignoring
significant scientific developments showing that the benefits are likely
magnitudes larger than the EPA estimated in nine years ago.191 The
final rule improperly alleges that the Agency must use the nowoutdated information supporting the issuance of MATS to justify its
current action.192 This assertion explicitly contradicts the EPA’s
mandate to account for advances in science.
Furthermore, the EPA’s determination that it is not appropriate
and necessary to regulate power plant HAP emissions under CAA § 112
could ultimately result in the removal of the current emissions
integrates all of these pollutants. We don’t get to breathe air that
just responds to one policy at a time, or reflects one pollutant at
a time. Air integrates all of these. That’s what we breathe, and
that’s what the environment receives. When we consider how to
analyze a particular policy path or trajectory or outcome, it’s
logical . . . to consider the full range of pollutants as best we’re
able.
Episode 13: Joe and Kathy Fallon Lambert on MATS/CPP/ACE and
Public Health, CleanLaw: Harv. Envtl. & Energy L. (Mar. 7, 2019),
at 46:09, https://soundcloud.com/user-995691545/joe-and-kathy-fallonlambert-on-matscppace-and-public-health/s-YASTo
[https://perma.cc/Z9MR-SC9Z].
190. Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and
Technology Review, 85 Fed. Reg. at 31,305.
191. See, e.g., Elsie M. Sunderland et al., Benefits of Regulating Hazardous
Air Pollutants from Coal and Oil-Fired Utilities in the United States, 50
Envtl. Science & Tech. 2117, 2117 (2016) (“[W]e elaborate upon three
key points: (1) Recent research demonstrates that quantified societal
benefits associated with declines in mercury deposition attributable to
implementation of MATS are much larger than the amount estimated by
EPA in 2011. (2) As-yet-unquantified benefits to human health and
wildlife from reductions in [power plant] mercury emissions are
substantial. (3) Contributions of [power plants] to locally deposited
mercury have been underestimated by EPA’s regulatory assessment.”);
see also Mercury Matters 2018: A Science Brief for Journalists and
Policymakers, Harv. Univ. Ctr. for the Env’t (Dec. 1, 2018),
https://environment.harvard.edu/news/general/mercury-matters-2018science-brief-journalists-and-policymakers [https://perma.cc/A8AL-9PX2]
(“The societal costs of neurocognitive deficits associated with methylmercury
exposure in the U.S. were estimated in 2017 to be approximately $4.8
billion per year.”).
192. Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and
Technology Review, 85 Fed. Reg. at 31,305.
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standards.193 The withdrawal makes the rulemaking vulnerable to legal
challenges.194 One month after the EPA published the final rule
reversing the appropriate and necessary finding, a coal mining company
filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of MATS.195 The company’s
complaint is primarily based on the EPA’s reversal of the appropriate
and necessary finding.196
As in ACE, the EPA appears aimed at undercutting its CAA
authority by asserting a specific, new legal interpretation and
repudiating an earlier interpretation of the same provision. Here it goes
further, potentially encumbering what should be its commitment to
incorporating the latest science by not only applying an out-of-themainstream methodology to cost–benefit analysis but also eschewing
the use of up-to-date scientific information. The proposal exhibits the
EPA’s determination to avoid the overriding imperatives of the CAA
by finding new limitations on its power to act.
D.

New Source Performance Standards for the Oil and Gas Sector

The Trump EPA is making it more difficult for the Agency to
regulate methane emissions under the CAA. Section 111(b) of the CAA
directs the EPA to establish New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS) for listed categories of new or modified stationary pollution
sources. To list a source category under Section 111, the EPA
Administrator must determine that emissions from the source category
“cause[], or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” (known
as a significant contribution finding).197 Once NSPS are set for emissions
from a source category, the EPA is obligated to issue guidelines to
address emissions of the pollutant in the same source category if the

193. EPA sought comment in the proposed withdrawal on whether the agency
has the authority to or is obligated to rescind the MATS rule if it
withdraws the finding. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units—
Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and
Technology Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2679 (proposed Feb. 7, 2019)
(Feb. 7, 2019). EPA did not determine that it had this authority or
withdraw MATS in the final rule.
194. Joseph Goffman, Rolling Back the Mercury and Air Toxic Standards:
Proposed Withdrawal of “Appropriate and Necessary”, Harv. L. Sch.:
Envtl. & Energy L. Program (Mar. 14, 2019), http://eelp.law.harvard
.edu/wp-content/uploads/MATS-Analysis-Goffman-final.pdf [https://perma
.cc/92VE-XLP3].
195. Westmoreland Mining Holdings v. EPA, No. 20-1160 (D.C. Cir., May 22,
2020).
196. Id.
197. Clean Air Act § 111(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2018).
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pollutant is not subject to regulation by other CAA provisions.198 This
relationship reflects Congress’s characteristic approach in the CAA to
address air-pollution challenges in a comprehensive manner.
In 2016, the EPA took two actions to address methane emissions
from the oil and gas sector. First, the Agency set NSPS for methane
emissions from the production, processing, transmission, and storage
segments within the already-listed “crude oil and natural gas
production” source category.199 Second, the EPA issued in 2016 an
Information Collection Request designed to collect the data needed to
develop emissions guidelines under subsection (d) for methane emissions
from the oil and gas sector.200
The Trump EPA, in turn, has deployed various strategies aimed at
attenuating the EPA’s ability to regulate methane emissions by failing
to acquire the necessary information and proposing additional
prerequisites for promulgating standards for sources within the oil and
natural gas sector. In 2017, the EPA cancelled the Information
Collection Request.201 In 2019, the Agency published a proposed rule to
repeal NSPS for the transmission and storage segment, which the
Agency had previously regulated within the “crude oil and natural gas
production” source category, and to rescind methane regulations for the
remaining sources within the oil and gas sector.202 The EPA also
solicited comments on a new interpretation of the CAA that would
require it to make a pollutant-specific, as opposed to source-categorywide, significant-contribution finding before regulating emissions of
additional pollutants.203 Each of these three proposals individually, and
potentially in combination, would defy the logic of Section 111’s
comprehensive structure, which addresses all pollution from a category
of sources, both new and existing. The proposals would also increase
methane and other HAP emissions. The EPA estimates that methane

198. Id. § 111(d)(1).
199. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 35,841 (June 3, 2016) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
200. See EPA, Information Collection Effort for Oil and Gas
Facilities 2–3 (2016).
201. See Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Obligation to Submit Information,
82 Fed. Reg. 12817 (Mar. 7, 2017).
202. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,244, 50,257, 50,259
(proposed Sept. 24, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
203. Id. at 50,261.
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emissions between 2019 and 2025 will increase by about 350,000 to
370,000 short tons under its proposed rule.204
The EPA defends its proposal to rescind NSPS for the transmission
and storage segment by claiming that these segments do not fall within
the source category and can only be regulated after the Agency makes
a separate finding for those segments as a distinct source category. By
restricting the EPA’s authority to regulate additional sources of
emissions within a listed source category, the EPA is encumbering its
ability to regulate those sources at all. Many individual segments may
be found to not contribute significantly to air pollution when not
considered as part of the larger industrial sector.
When the EPA established standards for the transmission and
storage segment, it found that crude oil and natural gas production
“broadly cover[ed]” this segment of the industry.205 Although the EPA
concluded that the Agency had the legal authority without issuing a
significant-contribution finding, it still included such a finding,
determining that the source category as a whole (oil and natural gas
production, processing, transmission, and storage) “contributes
significantly to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”206 The EPA is now proposing to find
that this action was improper, arguing that the transportation and
storage segment are “sufficiently distinct” from the larger source
category and must be regulated as an independent source category.207
In the proposal, the EPA suggests that it “was required to make a
finding that the transmission and storage segment in and of itself
‘contributes significantly to air pollution . . . ’ not simply that the
source category . . . ‘oil and natural gas production, processing,
transmission, and storage’ . . . ‘contributes significantly.’”208 The EPA
argues that this piecemeal approach is appropriate “because the natural
gas that enters the transmission and storage segment has different
composition and characteristics than the natural gas that enters the
production and processing segments.”209 Yet together, the four segments
constitute a single-sectoral enterprise that encompasses the full array
of equipment that brings the product from its underground residence
204. Id. at 50,277–78 (comparing emissions relative to two baselines; one that
estimated an increase of 350,000 short tons, and the other that estimated
an increase of 370,000 short tons).
205. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 35,833 (June 3, 2016) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
206. Id.
207. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources Review, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,257.
208. Id. (footnote omitted).
209. Id.
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to the point of commercial transaction in a more or less continuous
flow. The differences in the composition of the product, which by design
differs as it is being processed, have no bearing on the question of
whether the ensemble of equipment the source category comprises
contributes significantly to air pollution.
The EPA’s proposed interpretation of the statute would result in
segmented regulations on a drawn out and procedurally challenging
timeline that is contrary to Section 111’s design and the fundamental
comprehensive approach of the CAA. In its proposal, the EPA does not
offer a finding related to the emissions from the transmission and
storage segment; rather, it determines only that its previous rule was
invalid. That determination brings the regulatory process to a halt at
a point that leaves in place a residual set of incomplete regulations and
emissions increases. The proposal’s incompleteness indicates its
underlying purpose to avoid regulating through arbitrary
subcategorization.
The proposal introduces an additional element of regulatory delay
and avoidance. The EPA is soliciting comments on whether the Agency
should require a pollutant-specific, significant-contribution finding prior
to establishing NSPS for each pollutant, notwithstanding wellestablished findings that the source category contributes significant
levels of pollution overall.210 As the EPA concedes in its proposal, in
2016, the Agency “asserted that CAA section 111 authorizes it to
regulate a source category’s emissions of an air pollutant without a
pollutant-specific [significant contribution finding] as long as the EPA
has a ‘rational basis’ for doing so.”211 It then offers a variety of illfounded reasons for how it may be reasonable to conclude the exact
opposite.212 Although the proposed rule does not incorporate this
transformation of the Agency’s statutory interpretation, the EPA
solicits comments and provides multiple pages of legal argument to
support the proposition, suggesting that the Agency is seeking to bolster
the record in favor of reaching this determination following public
210. Id. at 50,266.
211. Id. at 50,262.
212. See, e.g., id. at 50,266 (“CAA Section 111(b)(1)(A)’s [significant
contribution finding] provision, when read in isolation, may appear to
require a [significant contribution finding] for the source category as a
prerequisite for listing the source category. However, should the EPA
instead conclude that Congress could not have intended that the EPA
promulgate NSPS without a pollutant-specific [significant contribution
finding] in light of, among other considerations, (1) the fact that Congress
adopted at the same time and subsequently amended at the same time
similarly phrased CAA provisions that do contemplate a pollutant-specific
finding prior to regulation, (2) the inherent vagueness of the rational basis
approach, and (3) the indications in the legislative history that Congress
did intend that the EPA make a pollutant-specific [significant
contribution finding] under CAA section 111?”).
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comments on the proposed rule.213 Much like the compartmentalization
of the source category, enacting this change would, at a minimum, delay
the EPA’s regulations of harmful pollutants by requiring an extra step.
In some instances, it could make it significantly more difficult for the
Agency to regulate emissions of certain pollutants at all.
Finally, the EPA argues that methane regulations for new and
modified sources under Section 111(b) are redundant, given the
standards for volatile organic compounds (VOCs) because compliance
with the latter will result in reductions in methane.214 This masks the
significant effect of the EPA’s proposed rescission of methane
regulations, which will be to delay indefinitely the regulation of
methane emitted at much higher levels from existing sources.215
Methane regulations for existing sources would not be redundant to the
regulation of VOCs because VOCs are not covered by Section 111(d),
which excludes pollutants from existing sources covered by other CAA
provisions. In contrast, only under Section 111(d) does the EPA have
the authority to set comprehensive guidelines for existing sources of
methane.216
In Section 111, Congress included two features characteristic of the
CAA’s overall approach of providing a comprehensive solution to
pollution: authorizing regulation by source category based on the
overall level of pollution it emits, and requiring the EPA to issue
guidelines for pollution from existing sources once it sets pollution
standards for new sources.217 The EPA’s proposal undermines these
features and its own legal authority. By removing NSPS for methane,
the EPA would remove the predicate for regulating existing sources of
methane in the oil and gas sector. This operates in tandem with the
EPA’s solicitation of comments on requiring a pollutant-specific
endangerment finding in place of its current authority to consider
pollution from the sector as a whole. The proposal aggravates the
damage it would do to Section 111’s comprehensive pollution-control
strategy by dividing the source category into covered and uncovered
segments on the basis of an arbitrary, pretextual argument that bears
little connection to how the sector operates.
213. See id. at 50,266–69.
214. Id. at 50,260–61.
215. See id. (“[T]he EPA has, to date, assumed that methane, if subjected to
a standard of performance for new sources, would trigger the application
of CAA section 111(d). Accordingly, given this assumption, the EPA
recognizes that rescinding the applicability of the NSPS to methane
emissions for the sources in the Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production
source category that are currently covered by the NSPS will mean that
existing sources of the same type in the source category will not be subject
to regulation under CAA section 111(d).”).
216. Id. at 50,259.
217. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2018).

967

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020
Disempowering the EPA

Finally, the proposal ignores Section 111’s technologydissemination purpose. The proposal acknowledges that the EPA’s
position that methane standards are redundant to VOC standards
reflects the performance of existing pollution-control technology, and
that new technology applicable to methane emissions is being
developed:
[T]he NSPS requirements as applied to VOCs will reduce methane
in the same amounts as those requirements, as applied to
methane, would as long as [optical gas imaging] with current
levels of sensitivity to methane continue to be used. The EPA is
aware that several new technologies are under development that
would detect speciated fugitive emissions from oil and natural gas
operations.218

This admission is in stark contrast to the technology-promoting
provisions of the CAA. Through its deregulation strategy, the EPA
essentially abandons its role in technology diffusion, despite the
potential for new technology that could further control emissions of a
harmful pollutant. Such an action by the Agency is counter to its allbut-explicit CAA mandate.

Conclusion
What unites these four actions by the Trump EPA is not just that
they roll back individual environmental protections and could result in
emissions increases; they also each rely on a new legal interpretation
that diminishes the EPA’s regulatory authority under the CAA.
Ultimately, the courts may uphold each of them as consistent with the
CAA’s meaning and intent. Currently, however, there are at least two
reasons to question the EPA’s intentions and to view its statutory
interpretations as inconsistent with the CAA.
First, each new interpretation reverses or rejects the EPA’s
previous position on the same air-quality issue. Each offers a version of
the CAA that is both ill-designed for solving the relevant problem and
impervious to scientific, technological, and practical change. The
Agency’s repeal of the Clean Power Plan relies on simple textual
analysis and reaches a conclusion that disempowers the EPA. The
Agency denies itself the ability to engage in effective problem-solving
that would account for the realities of the electricity grid. Similarly, its
reversal of the MATS adequate-and-necessary finding distorts both
Section 112(n)(1)(A) and the Supreme Court’s holding in Michigan v.
EPA, offering a logic that thwarts Congress’s intent to reduce powerplant HAP emissions via regulation if compliance with other CAA
provisions does not result in adequate reductions. To rescind
218. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources Review, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,260.
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California’s vehicle-emissions waiver, the EPA abdicated its CAAbased authority, and in the alternative, read Sections 209(b) and 177
as non-responsive to the current understanding of air pollutants. To
defend its proposed amendments to the 2016 oil and gas NSPS, the
EPA primarily relied on an irrelevant observation about the content of
natural gas to disaggregate emissions and to avoid reducing emissions
in a comprehensive manner.
Each of these new interpretations replaces an earlier one that
understood the CAA and the individual statutory provisions in exactly
the opposite way. Each previous interpretation prioritized successfully
addressing an air-quality problem and discerning Congress’s meaning
and intent. Each responded to the language and construction of the
relevant statutory provision, aligning them with the Act’s overall
structure and purpose. The EPA’s success in developing the Cross-State
Rule remains instructive. The Agency approached the rules that are
now the target of the current reversals with the same imperative:
adapting the CAA to the current realities and finding within its
language the tools to adequately meet the air-quality challenge.
Second, since its beginning, the Trump Administration has
prioritized deregulation as an end in itself. In early 2017, thenpresidential advisor Steve Bannon promised to “deconstruct[] . . . the
administrative state.”219 President Trump issued two executive orders
delivering on the promise. One required that any new regulation be
paired with the repeal of two existing regulations.220 The second, styled
as promoting energy independence, directed the EPA to “review” the
Clean Power Plan and the 2016 oil and gas NSPS as part of a policy of
alleviating the “burden” on energy production.221 The EPA has also
taken steps to weaken the NAAQS review process by undercutting the
review process’s robust scientific foundation, which, following the
express language of the CAA, has been a key driver of the EPA’s
ongoing regulatory agenda.222 These actions are instrumental to the
219. See Max Fisher, Stephen K. Bannon’s CPAC Comments, Annotated and
Explained, N.Y. Times (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
02/24/us/politics/stephen-bannon-cpac-speech.html [https://perma.cc/
6CHP-R2WT].
220. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
221. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
222. See Laura Bloomer & Joseph Goffman, The Legal Consequences of EPA’s
Disruption of the NAAQS Process, Harv. L. Sch.: Envtl. & Energy
L. Program (Sept. 30, 2019), http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/
uploads/Legal-Consequences-of-NAAQS-Changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YSQ7-GMDZ]. See generally Episode 32: EPA Science Advisory Panel
Changes with Gretchen Goldman and Laura Bloomer, CleanLaw: Harv.
Envtl. & Energy L. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://soundcloud.com/user995691545/epa-science-advisory-panel-changes-with-gretchen-goldman-andlaura-bloomer [https://perma.cc/T8EU-4RLH] (discussing the EPA’s
recent approach to NAAQS).
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EPA’s deregulatory approach given the range of CAA provisions that
are triggered by tightening the standards.
In this context, the EPA’s four new legal interpretations emerge as
instruments to achieve the Trump Administration’s broader
deregulatory agenda rather than efforts to perfect the EPA’s
understanding of the CAA. If each of these interpretations is confirmed,
either as fixed precedent or a strong presumption, then the EPA’s
course will be redirected from that of the past several decades. At the
very least, these interpretations reflect an agency that approaches its
legal authorities as static rather than “progressive” and that works to
find limitations in its mandates rather than imperatives to continually
respond to ongoing threats to air quality, public health, and the
environment.

970

